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Abstract
This report presents an approach called IFlow which allows the model-
driven development of secure systems regarding information flow. The
approach focuses on the application domain of mobile applications and
web services. A developer starts by creating an abstract UML model of a
system where he can additionally specify information flow properties the
system must satisfy. From the model, Java code is generated together
with an information flow policy that can be checked by automated analy-
sis tools like Jif or Joana. In addition, the UML model is transformed into
a formal specification which is the basis for formal reasoning within our
formal framework including the interactive theorem prover KIV. While
automated tools are designed for the simple property of noninterference,
formal verification allows to express more complex properties. In order
that the results of verification can be carried to the code level and that
the results of automated code analysis can be used as lemmas for formal
verification, an information flow-preserving refinement relation is estab-
lished between the formal specification and the code. The focus of this
report is on the aspects of formal verification.
1 Introduction
The market for mobile devices, especially smartphones, is rapidly growing. PCs
and laptops are getting replaced for common task like browsing the internet,
sending emails, or handling business documents. A smartphone offers even more
functions, like navigating, talking to other people, taking photos, and listening
to music. All these applications have one thing in common: they all require or
use data from the phone—data which reveals personal information about the
user. This includes confidential information, and aggregated, it constitutes a
profile of the user’s character and practices.
In order to use even more functions and services on a smartphone, appli-
cations which are developed by third-party providers can be downloaded and
installed via app stores. Smartphone users become more and more aware of
leaving digital fingerprints in the web, and they recognize data privacy as an
important issue. With personal information on their phones, apps pose an enor-
mous threat on privacy.
It is very common that gratis apps send personal data to advertisement
companies. Recently, several apps were discovered where data is leaked without
authorization [1, 4]. Leakage can also occur accidentally due to programming
failures. Users wish that, with every downloaded application, they are informed
about its privacy policy, and they want guarantees that this policy is satisfied
by the application.
With our project called IFlow1 we contribute to improving the current sit-
uation by developing a model-driven software engineering method for privacy-
aware systems and integrating information flow analysis. The application do-
main of IFlow includes mobile applications and services. By modeling security
properties already in design phase, a software developer thinks about security
from the beginning and on a high level where he is not distracted by details
1This work is sponsored by the priority programme 1496 “Reliably Secure Software Sys-
tems” of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG.
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of the code. The IFlow approach in whole is presented in Section 2. The re-
port focuses on the modeling of systems in Section 3 and on formal verification
of information flow properties Section 4. Section 5 concludes the report. [8]
addresses the generation of code in detail.
2 The IFlow Approach
Abstract Model
(UML + IF Properties)
Formal Model
(ASM + Proof Goals, formal verification)
Code Skeleton
(Java, automatic IF check)
Final Code
(Java)
generate
program by hand
transform
(1)
(2)
(3) (4)
 refine
Figure 1: Model driven approach of IFlow.
IFlow is an approach for the model-driven development of privacy-critical,
secure systems. It is depicted in Figure 1. In the beginning, a developer models
a system (1), which can include mobile applications and web services. When
modeling the dynamic part of a system, the developer focuses on the commu-
nication between components and on security aspects. The application logic
within components does not have to be modeled in full detail. Instead, lo-
cal functionality can be modeled as a black box. In addition, the developer
can specify information flow properties and express confidentiality of data. For
modeling, a subset of UML is used, together with a UML profile for approach-
specific elements. The UML model is then extended with security annotations
depicting an information flow policy.
The platform-independent UML model is the source for two transformations.
In one branch, a Java code skeleton is generated (3). The code is analyzed by
automated information flow analysis tools. We investigated Jif [11] and Joana
[7]. In order to obtain complete Java code, gaps in the code are programmed
by hand. Then, the code analysis tool can check the code again for newly
introduced information flow and finally be deployed to an Android phone2 and
to Java EE web services (4).
Since automated code analysis tools can basically express the property of
noninterference [5], they are limited when it comes to checking more complex
information flow properties. Therefore, in the other transformation branch, a
formal model (2) is generated which is integrated with a framework allowing
tool-supported verification. We aim to express and prove various properties
which include the declassification of certain data and to consider different poli-
cies of a program in different phases of lifetime.
The two branches are not treated separately. Instead, a 1:1 information flow-
preserving refinement relation is established between the formal specification
level and the code level. This enables to carry results of verification to the code
level and to lift results of code analysis tools to the formal level where they can
be used as lemmas for verification.
2Android is a natural choice as mobile target platform since it is the most widespread
mobile operating system and its applications are based on Java.
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This report is going to illustrate the formal aspects of the IFlow approach
and present the formal framework in more detail.
3 Modeling Information Flow Secure Systems
3.1 Travel Planner Case Study
We explain the IFlow approach with the case study Travel Planner, which is a
travel booking system consisting of a travel agency service (TA) providing flight
offers to the user of a mobile travel planner (TP) application, developed by the
TA. The user is able to select a favored flight offer from a list of offers received
from the TA and pay for the flight ticket directly at the airline service using
the credit card data stored inside a credit card center application on his mobile
device. The TA then receives a commission from the airline. Secure information
flow within this system has to be ensured to provide the user with the guarantee
that his credit card data is only ever received by the intended airline, and only
after his explicit confirmation.
3.2 Static View
IFlow uses UML to model both static and dynamic views of an application,
which can consist of several application agents communicating with each other.
We use a class diagram to model smartphone applications, web services or user
interfaces, representing each of those agents with a UML class marked with a
Application-, Service- or User-stereotype from the predefined IFlow UML
profile. Agent class attributes denote data storage of the agent, with their data
types also modeled as classes within the class diagram. A Manual-stereotyped
class contains the signatures for all manual methods (i.e. methods that can later
be implemented manually by the developer in order to realize certain application
functionality) to be used in sequence diagrams for this application. Figure
2 shows an excerpt from the class diagram for the TravelPlanner case study,
picturing all involved agents3.
The IF annotations are modeled as UML constraints on class attributes
to define their security level and establish a noninterference property (or sev-
eral). An annotation consists of a list of IFlow agents being able to observe
the annotated attribute. Figure 2 shows the User annotation applied to the
creditCardData-attribute of class CreditCardCenter, implying that only the
User agent is able to read it, while the attribute flightOffers of agent Airline
is annotated with the list User, TravelAgency, Airline, making flight offers es-
sentially public to all agents. Such annotations imply a lattice, with informa-
tion being able to flow only to equally or more restrictively annotated model
elements. Agent communication takes place by agents exchanging instances of
special message classes, defined by the modeler inside a class diagram by in-
heriting from an abstract class with the IFlow Message-stereotype (as seen in
Figure 3 and Figure 9) or predefined in an IFlow UML module (see Figure 11).
3The full model can be found in Figure A and on our website, http://www.informatik.
uni-augsburg.de/lehrstuehle/swt/se/projects/iflow/
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Figure 2: Agent classes
Figure 3: (Excerpt of) message classes
5
Figure 4: Booking a flight with an airline
Figure 5: Asking the user to choose an offer from a list
3.3 Dynamic View
Agent communication is modeled with sequence diagrams, with lifelines rep-
resenting communicating agents. IFlow sequence diagrams utilize a modified
version of the Model Extended Language (MEL)4 to express message instantia-
tions, method calls or local variable definitions. In order to fix the MEL syntax
and the subset of UML usable in IFlow models we defined a metamodel, which
is also used to instantiate intermediate IFlow models in the automatic model
transformations.
Sequence messages carry the name of appropriate message classes followed by
a list of parenthesized lifeline class attributes or local variables, which are used to
instantiate the message. The order of those variables is determined by the order
of attributes defined in the message class. Since non-primitive attributes of a
class are denoted with a named association, and UML class associations are not
ordered, we define the following guideline: if a class has exactly one association,
it is to be instantiated last. If a class has more than one association, the modeler
needs to define a class constructor with an ordered list of parameters carrying
4The MEL language was initially designed for the SecureMDD project [10] in order to fully
express the functionality of an interactive agent in a UML activity diagram
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the same name and type as instantiable class attributes.
The receiving lifeline is then able to access those variables or attributes.
Each message must be modeled to receive an answer message, while communi-
cation with a user is executed by sending a predefined user message to the user
lifeline. Messages received by the user lifeline are meant to represent a dialog-
or confirmation messages on the user interface. In order to increase the read-
ability and reusability of certain communication fragments, it is also possible
to reference other sequence diagrams by utilizing the UML Interaction Use
element pointing to the appropriate diagram. Each application task, modeled
as the communication between agents must begin with a IFlow-predefined user
message from a user lifeline to an application. Manual methods are modeled
as UML Self Messages; their return value can be assigned to an implicitly
declared variable and then be reused as input for other manual methods or as
part of a message to another agent.
Figure 4 shows an excerpt from the communication between the TP and
the airline, booking a flight by providing the airline with the ID of the flight
offer and the user’s credit card data. The assignment id := flightOffer.id
implies that the ID of the offer is being extracted from an attribute of a previ-
ously selected flight offer stored in the local variable flightOffer. The airline
can access the ID via the newly created local variable id of type Integer (as
implicitly derived from the type of the field flightOffer.id). It then calls
the manual method processBooking via a UML self-message; the method is
defined in the Manual class (see Figure 2) in order to process the booking of
the flight. It receives both the ID and the credit card data, since no manual
method can access local variables or attributes of its callee in order to prevent
the developer from introducing new information flows by reading or writing to
them.
We annotate each message between IFlow agents in order to specify the
security level of data any agent is able to receive. In Figure 4, each message is
annotated with {User, Airline}, which is more restrictive than the security
level of flight offers (see Figure 2) and therefore allows us to send a flight offer
ID to the airline. However, the user’s credit card data is even more restrictive,
which is why it has to be explicitly declassified prior to being sent. This is done
in a different sequence diagram after confirming the declassification with the
user (see Figure 15).
Figure 5 shows an interaction with the user, with the TP requesting the user
to select a flight offer from a previously received list of offers (see Figure 13). To
accomplish this, the TP sends the predefined user message GetSingleSelection
(see Figure 14) containing the list to the user interface. It answers with the user
message RetSingleSelection containing one element from the list. We model
the user selection with a generic attribute of the user class singleSelection,
which is assigned to an implicitly declared variable flightOffer upon receiving
of the answer by TP. Its type is derived from the type the elements in the sent
list, here FlightOffer.
To improve readability and modularity of sequence diagrams, we allow them
to reference each other via UML Interaction Use elements pointing to the
used diagram. We identify the initial diagram used to denote the beginning
of an interaction stretching over several sequences by sending a user message
from the user lifeline to any IFlow application (Start message in Figure 12).
To access the sensors of a mobile device we will introduce several predefined
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methods, to be used in sequence diagrams as self messages just as any man-
ual method. For now, we support the GPS sensor with the predefined methods
getCurrentGPSPos() and getAllGPSPos(); the first returns the current loca-
tion of the device, while the second provides the application with a list of all loca-
tions visited since it has been activated by the user. They have to be annotated
in order to identify the initial security level of this data. We support the declas-
sification of data by allowing MEL statements like y := declassify(x), which
declassifies data x and assigns it the declassification results to y. Such state-
ments have to be explicitly annotated with the source and target security levels
of the declassification, separated with an arrow (e.g. User->User,Airline in
Figure 15).
4 Formal Framework
Formal verification provides strong guarantees that a system satisfies certain
properties. In this section, we first explain which information flow formalism
we chose as a basis for our formal specification and why it conforms well with
the properties we want to express. Then, the generic system model, considered
by the formalism, is introduced. We created an instance of the system model,
which we tailored to our application domain and illustrated with the Travel
Planner case study. Analogously, the specification of information flow policies
is presented. Experiences of the verification process are reported. The section
ends with the argumentation why the refinement relation holds between the
formal specification level and the code level.
4.1 Formal System Specification
Our formal framework allows us to formally reason about systems’ properties.
Therefore, a formal specification of the system and the desired properties are
required, which, according to the model-driven paradigm are derived from the
UML model.
In the beginning, we want to be able to express noninterference properties
by defining an information flow policy for a certain system. After investigating
several formalisms and what properties can be expressed by them, we chose to
support and use the definition of intransitive noninterference by Ron van der
Meyden [14]. Van der Meyden’s formalism considered a state-observed model
and developed a version with “structured state” based on variables. We also
evaluated the noninterference notions of Rushby [12] and MAKS [9]. Rushby
only slightly differs from van der Meyden. According to his definition, a state
cannot be observed directly but actions produce observable outputs. The MAKS
framework considers event-based system models. It allows to express properties
about what an observer can learn about the occurrence and non-occurrence of
events. Since IFlow considers a setting where the privacy of data is protected,
it is natural to choose a formalism where properties of data (rather than events)
can be defined. Additionally, van der Meyden allows specifying intransitive
policies which generalize the transitive case and can be utilized to define policies
that include declassification channels.
According to van der Meyden, a system is defined by a state machine. There
is a function step where an action causes the transition from one state to
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another. He defines a version with “structured state” which refines the abstract
notion of state to a set variables. The values of state variables is obtained via
the function contents which has the signature state×name→ value, whereas
contents(s, n) delivers the value of variable with name n in state s.
In our approach, the generic system model is refined to match the applica-
tion domain of several agents communicating with each other. The resulting
specification will be illustrated with the instance of the Travel Planner system.
The system’s structure is derived from the UML class diagram which shows
agents and their stored data. It is specified using abstract data types [6]. Each
type is specified modularly in its own specification extending former specifica-
tions and resulting in a graph with dependency edges. UML classes of type
Agent are mapped to instances of the type agent in the formal model. The
names of their attributes as well as local variables are captured by the name-
specification. Since different agents might have variables with same names,
the set of names of the original formalism is represented by the cross prod-
uct name× agent. Variables can be of different types in the UML model (e.g.,
CreditCardDetails and FlightOffer in the Travel Planner example from Fig-
ure 2). In the formal model these types are subsumed by the type data which
is a data format where any information relevant for information flow security
is defined recursively. The data specification for the case study is depicted in
Figure 6. Instead of the static function contents, we store the system state
in a higher order variable mapping name × agent → data. Assumed that the
system state is represented by variable content, content(n, a) returns the value
of the variable with name n of agent a in the current state.
The dynamic part of the system is modeled with UML sequence diagrams.
The UML messages are named according to message data types which were
defined earlier in a class diagram (see Figure 3). These messages serve as a
container for the transmitted data. Hence, they are also included in the data
specification in Figure 6. On the one hand, messages are containers for data
transmission, on the other hand, they induce an action to the receiving agent.
The names for the corresponding actions are derived from the message names
but have to be unique; or more concrete: one message can be used to send
data both from agent A to B and from agent C to D, whereas distinguishable
actions have to be inferred. The actions of the system are defined in specification
command5.
In the formal model, the behavior of the system is expressed with an abstract
state machine (ASM) [3] which is defined in the corresponding specification ASM.
The specification of the system’s behavior builds on its structural specification.
For each possible action in the system, one ASM rule is defined. Whenever
a certain action occurs, the corresponding ASM rule is executed. The scope
of an actions reaches from the reception of a message to the sending of an
answer. If, in a sequence diagram, there is a manual method between the
incoming and the return message, two actions (and two ASM rules) originate:
the first action receives the message and the second calls the manual method and
returns an answer. Manual methods are mapped to functions with signatures
which are equivalent to those of the original methods. They are declared in the
localMethods specification.
When a message is transmitted, it is stored into an inbox of the receiving
5The terms “action” and “command” are used synonymously in this report.
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data =
data specification
using command, string-less, nat-mult, agent
data = CreditCardDetails (. .data : string ;) with isCreditCardDetails
| FlightOffer (. .id : data ; . .airline : agent ;) with isFlightOffer
| RequestData (. .data : string ;) with isRequestData
| GetFlightOffers (. .requestData : data ;) with isGetFlightOffers
| RetFlightOffers (. .flightOffers : data ;) with isRetFlightOffers
| ReleaseCCD (. .receiver : data ;) with isReleaseCCD
| DeclassifiedCCD (. .ccd : data ;) with isDeclassifiedCCD
| BookFlightOffer (. .id : data ; . .ccd : data ;) with isBookFlightOffer
| ConfirmBooking (. .id : data ;)
| PayCommission (. .id : data ;)
| DataList (. .list : dataList ;) with isDataList
| Input (. .at : nat → data ;) with isInput
| InputCounter (. .nr : nat ;) with isInputCounter
| Boolean (. .boolean : bool ;) with isBoolean
| Number (. .number : nat ;) with isNumber
| Command (. .cmd : command ;) with isCommand
| Idle
| Agent (. .agent : agent ;) with isAgent
| null
| Start
| GetInputRequestData
| RetInputRequestData (. .input : data ;) with isRetInputRequestData
| GetSingleSelection (. .selection : data ;) with isGetSingleSelection
| RetSingleSelection (. .selection : data ;) with isRetSingleSelection
| GetMulitpleSelection (. .selection : data ;) with isGetMultipleSelection
| RetMultipleSelection (. .selection : data ;) with isRetMultipleSelection
| ConfirmRelease (. .what : data ; . .receiver : data ;) with isConfirmRelease
| RetConfirmation
| Show (. .data : data ;) with isShow
| Ok
;
dataList = []
| . + . prio 9 (. .first : data ; . .rest : dataList ;) prio 9 ;
end data specification
Figure 6: Data specification
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agent. Therefore, inboxes appear in the data specification. An agent has an
inbox for each action it can handle. However, an action is only processed if
the action is enabled in the agent’s state and there is data written to the cor-
responding inbox. Every agent has got its own internal state which is defined
implicitly in the sequence diagrams. The possible states of an agent are com-
puted automatically from the UML model. Initially, an agent is in state “idle”
and is waiting for an action which is enabled in this state. When the agent
processes an action, its state changes into another state. The new state either
expects another action to be processed locally, or, if it sends a message to an-
other agent, it waits for an answer. When the agent sends a return message of
the initial message, it finally sets its state to “idle” again. The transitions of an
agents internal state are defined by one ASM rule for each agent. The relation
between actions and the internal state, in which they are accepted, is coded in
the acceptedCmds specification.
To illustrate the specification, an excerpt of ASM rules is shown in Listing
1. The first two ASM rules correspond to actions which originate from Figure 4.
In ASM rule BOOKFLIGHTOFFER, in the beginning, function Airline waiting4
checks if the airline accepts the action BookFlightOfferCmd in its current state
and if the inbox for the action is non-empty. If so, the action is executed and
the arguments of the transmitted message are written from the inbox into local
variables of the airline. By calling AIRLINE NEXT, the internal state is set. Since
a local method is modeled between the original and its return message, there
is no new message sent in the end of this action. For ASM rule AIRLINE NEXT
there is no corresponding action. Instead, it is responsible for the state tran-
sitions of the airline. Dependent of the action which was just processed a new
state is set. Since the action was executed, the message is also deleted from the
inbox. By calling AIRLINE NEXT in the context of BOOKFLIGHTOFFER, the inbox
for BookFlightOfferCmd is emptied and the state is set to accepting only the
action ProcessBookingCmd (see lines 11 and 12). When the latter action oc-
curs, corresponding ASM rule PROCESSBOOKING is called (lines 22 ff.). Function
Airline waiting4 again checks whether the action is accepted in the current
state of airline. For this action, there is no additional check if something is writ-
ten into an inbox since the action does not directly follow the reception of a mes-
sage. There is no inbox to read from. In line 24, local method processBooking
is called according to the method call from Figure 4. The subsequent status
transition sets the status to Idle (see line 15 in AIRLINE NEXT). No inbox must
be emptied. After the method call a return message is sent back to the travel
planner which happens in line 25. A message called OK (which contains no ar-
guments) is returned. Since this message is typically used as an empty return
message, the action’s name differs from the message name to be unique.
Listing 1: ASM rules which are derived from sequence diagrams
1 BOOKFLIGHTOFFER {
i f ( A i r l i n e wa i t i n g 4 ( BookFlightOfferCmd , content ) ) then {
3 content ( id , a i r l i n e ) := ( content ( inbox BookFlightOfferCmd ,
a i r l i n e ) ) . id ;
content ( ccd dec l , a i r l i n e ) := ( content ( inbox BookFlightOfferCmd
, a i r l i n e ) ) . c cd de c l ;
5 AIRLINE NEXT;
}
7 }
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9 AIRLINE NEXT {
i f ( ac t i on = BookFlightOfferCmd ) then {
11 content ( inbox BookFlightOfferCmd , a i r l i n e ) := null ;
content ( wait ing4 , a i r l i n e ) := Command( ProcessBookingCmd ) ;
13 }
else i f (cmd = ProcessBookingCmd ) then {
15 content ( wait ing4 , a i r l i n e ) := I d l e ;
}
17 else {
. . .
19 }
}
21
PROCESSBOOKING {
23 i f ( A i r l i n e wa i t i n g 4 ( ProcessBookingCmd , content ) ) then {
processBooking ( content ( f l i g h tO f f e r , a i r l i n e ) , content ( ccd dec l ,
a i r l i n e ) ) ;
25 AIRLINE NEXT;
content ( inbox OkBookFlightOfferCmd , t rave lP lanne r ) := Ok;
27 }
}
In our approach, we also model user interaction (e.g., in Figure 5). This
is modeled with a message sent from an application to the user and a return
message. From these message, two ASM rules originate. Actual user input
is simulated by providing input arrays of arbitrary length for each action. To
capture information flow in a realistic sense, the returned value of the user
shall be dependent of the displayed data. This means for Figure 5 that the
chosen flightOffer depends on the displayed list of flightOffers as well as on
the user’s choice. In specification userMethods, corresponding functions are
defined to capture user interaction. In ASM rule GETSINGLESELECTION (see
Figure 2), first, a new user input is fetched from the array of inputs for the ac-
tion GetSingleSelectionCmd by calling PROVIDEINPUT GETSINGLESELECTION.
Function selectOne is declared in userMethods. It is called with the received
list of elements and the current input, constituting the choice, as arguments
returning the chosen element. Of course, the user has no status. However,
with the call USER FINISHED the inbox is emptied which, in the figurative sense,
means that the user dialog is closed.
Listing 2: ASM rules which are derived from sequence diagrams
GETSINGLESELECTION : GETSINGLESELECTION {
2 i f ( Use r r e c e i v ed ( GetSingleSelectionCmd , content ) ) then {
PROVIDEINPUT GETSINGLESELECTION;
4 content ( inbox RetSingleSe lect ionCmd , t rave lP lanne r ) :=
Re tS i ng l eS e l e c t i on ( se l ec tOne ( (
content inbox GetSing leSe lect ionCmd , user ) . s e l e c t i o n ,
content ( input ( GetSingleSelect ionCmd ) , user ) ) ) ;
6 USER FINISHED ;
}
8 }
The full system specification of the travel planner application is shown in Sec-
tion B.2.
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4.2 Specification of Information Flow Policies
Noninterference is a property to express information flow security and was in-
troduced by Goguen/Meseguer [5]. For the canonical case with two security
domains, one with high confidentiality (H) and one with low confidentiality (L),
it says that actions happening in the high domain can neither be observed di-
rectly nor anything about them can be learned at all. When extending the
noninterference property to data, the requirement is that variables written in
the high domain must not be read in the low domain. The canonical policy
L ; H, H 6; L is sufficient for theoretical considerations. For real-world ap-
plications, a policy generally requires more domains. In our approach, domains
are defined as sets of agents which are able to observe data of this particular
domain.
After the domains have been defined, an information flow policy is consti-
tuted by the following specifications:
• The interference relation; (with signature: domain×domain) expresses
from which domain information may flow to which domain. It can be
derived from the security lattice of the UML model and the set of agents
forming a domain.
• observe and alter, which we defined as relations (with signatures: domain
×name × agent), express which variables can be observed/altered by a
domain. The specification is obtained from the security annotations of
attributes and inferred for local variables, depending on the security level
of the right hand side of the first assignment.
• The observation function obs (original signature: state × domain →
observation) defines what observation one domain can make in a state.
We defined the observation as a subset of the system state. The observable
subset for a domain is obtained using the observe relation.
• The function dom (with signature action → domain) describes the vis-
ibility of an action and also what variables can be read inside it. The
specification is obtained from the security annotation of the messages in
the sequence diagrams.
Defining a noninterference policy is a challenging task. Finding a suitable
set of domains is the most important prerequisite to specify a property of nonin-
terference. Different properties require different sets of domains. It is not clear
how to derive a policy systematically.
For us, the following strategy was successful:
1. Inspect variables in the application and annotate which agents may ob-
serve it.
2. Examine the actions and choose a domain (defined by a set of agents).
Since an action reads and writes variables, the action’s domain must allow
this and be consistent with the variables’ annotations from step 1. This
defines the set of domains and the mapping from actions to domains for
function dom. The set of agents of each domain implicitly defines the
interference relation ;.
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3. The observe and alter relations are then calculated. This requires us to
examine each action. Whenever a variable is read or written, it is added
to the observe- or alter- relation of the action’s domain respectively.
This results in a minimum required set of observable/alterable variables
for each domain. Since the observe-/alter-relations are calculated from
the application, they must be checked for adequacy.
A transitive noninterference policy in many cases is too restrictive and must
be weakened by allowing the declassification of data into a lower. For exam-
ple, the travel planner declassifies creditCardData to enable the booking of a
flight. The MEL syntax in our approach allows to introduce explicit declassify-
statements in sequence diagrams. The statement is treated as an additional
action. The action is mapped to a new domain, which serves as a declassifica-
tion channel. At this point, the intransitivity of van der Meyden’s formalism
is exploited. The following scenario illustrates the policy changes: Let A and
B be two domains with A 6; B. Variable x is alterable by A. If the content of
x is read in domain B, the policy becomes inconsistent. The solution is to use
the declassify statement x decl := declassify(x) which is executed in an action
with associated domain D. The domain interference specification is extended by
A; D and D ; B. Domain D may observe x and alter x decl whereas domain
B may observe x decl.
For the travel planner example, we started by requiring that creditCardData
is not sent to the travel agency. There is no differentiation in this requirement
about information flow between the (smartphone) applications TravelPlanner
and CreditCardCenter and what is displayed to the user. Therefore, no differ-
entiation was made; if a domain contains the agent User this means that the
domain is also visible for the applications on the smartphone.
The following domains originated (the corresponding domain names in the
formal model are written in parenthesis):
• All actions that do not concern creditCardData are assigned domain
{User, TravelAgency, Airline} (User TA A Dom).
• The actions (and variables) related to creditCardData are assigned do-
main {User} (User Decl2A Dom).
• Before the booking process, creditCardData must be declassified. There-
fore, a declassification domain is introduced allowing flow from {User} to
{User, Airline} (Decl2A Dom).
• When creditCardData is sent to the airline during the booking process,
the corresponding domain is {User, Airline} (User A Dom).
Specification domInterference, depicted in Figure B.3, shows the implied in-
terferences between domains.
The complete specification of the policy can be found in in Section B.3.
The specification of the formal system model has been derived systemati-
cally from the UML model by hand. The goal of our model-driven approach
is to automate the transformation. The transformation is split in two steps:
First, the UML model is parsed into the intermediate MEL model using Java.
The UML model is interpreted for the IFlow approach and is already extended
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domInterference =
enrich domain with
predicates . ⇒ . : domain × domain;
axioms
reflexivity : domvar ⇒ domvar;
// transitve policy:
User TA A Dom ⇒ User A Dom;
User TA A Dom ⇒ User Decl2A Dom;
User A Dom ⇒ User Decl2A Dom;
// intransite policy with declassfication domain:
User Decl2A Dom ⇒ Decl2A Dom;
Decl2A Dom ⇒ User A Dom;
end enrich
Figure 7: Specification of domain interferences
with MEL statements. The MEL meta model defines the semantics of the mod-
eling approach, according to the descriptions of Figure 3. Xpand is used 6 to
transform the MEL model with a model-to-text transformation into the textual
representation of the final system specification.
In KIV, a system is specified in a modular way. This allows to be flex-
ible regarding the exchange of certain parts, e.g., the policy. For the same
reason, another formalism can be implemented in the specification. Once the
transformations have been established, the model-driven approach allows to
support multiple formalisms. Different properties can be defined with different
formalisms and the specification is enriched with the desired ones individually for
each case. We consider to integrate the MAKS framework [9] as it is very pow-
erful to express properties about deductions of occurrence and non-occurrence
of events.
4.3 Proving Information Flow Properties
For the noninterference property, security is defined using the so-called purge-
function. A program execution is represented by a sequence of actions. The
purge-function deletes, from a sequence of actions, those actions which influence
the observation of a particular domain. In the transitive case, all actions are
deleted which domain directly interferes the observing domain. In the intransi-
tive variant of the purge-function, all actions are deleted which can directly or
indirectly interfere with the observing domain within the given action sequence.
If for every domain holds that the resulting purged subsequence is indistinguish-
able from the original sequence, then the system is considered secure. Van der
Meyden presents so-called unwinding conditions. If these conditions hold after
each executed action, the system is secure. With the unwinding conditions each
6Xpand, http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/m2t/?project=xpand
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action can be considered locally, instead of inspecting program traces. This
reduces the verification effort enormously. For van der Meyden’s variant with a
“structured state”, he gives the so-called reference monitor assumptions (RMA)
and the alter-observe-interference condition (AOI), which imply the unwinding
conditions and thereby security as well.
At first, we specified the generic noninterference formalism as given by van
der Meyden [14] with the interactive theorem prover KIV [2]. Subsequently,
we proved that the RMAs and AOI imply the unwinding conditions and that
the unwinding conditions imply the security notion based on the purge function.
We derived the application model for the travel planner case study and specified
the policy as described above. Then, we proved that the travel planner model
is an instantiation of the generic system model of van der Meyden.
Finally, we proved that the RMAs and AOI hold for the specified system
and the policy. The definitions of the conditions look in our system as follows:
• RMA1:
eqd(c, domvar, c1) ` obs(c, domvar) = obs(c1, domvar)
• RMA2:
` eqd(c, dom(co), c0) ∧ c(nam, ag) = c0(nam, ag) ∧ alter(dom(co),
nam, ag)
→ 〈STEP#〉 〈STEP#〉 c2(nam, ag) = c3(nam, ag)
• RMA3:
` ¬ 〈STEP#〉 c2(nam, ag) = c(nam, ag) → alter(dom(co), nam, ag)
RMA 1 says that if the observable variables of two states appear equal to an
observing domain then the observations that can be made in both states are
the same. Since we defined the observation to be the observable part of the
state, this condition trivially holds. RMA 2 and RMA 3 basically ensure that
the sets of the observable and alterable variables respectively are chosen big
enough w.r.t. the actions reading and writing from variables. For these proofs,
the condition has to be satisfied for each action. Using heuristics, the proofs
were performed fully automated by KIV. AOI then ensures that the sets of
observable and alterable variables do not violate the domain interference policy,
i.e., if a variable is alterable in domain d1 and observable in domain d2 then
there must be interference d1; d2. For this proof all combinations of domain
interferences have to be considered. Hence, the proof effort grows quadratically
with the number of security domains.
During verification, we learned some issues concerning the system and the
policy specification: The scope of actions was not suitable for all cases. If an
action writes into the inbox of the following, more confidential action, the policy
is violated. Instead, a new action for sending a message has to be defined, so
that, writing to the inbox can happen with the same confidentiality as reading
from it. In the travel planner application, we introduced sending actions where
they were needed, but we consider introducing generic sending actions. We also
discovered the problem that the internal state of each agent is read and written
by every action processed by the agent. Hence, all domains correlating to the
actions interfere each other. Actually, the states just ensure the defined order
of actions of the application which is modeled with the sequence diagrams. The
states are assigned only constant values, which do not depend on the variables
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of the system, and, thus, they do not encode conditional branching. As a first
solution, we extended the required domain interferences and proved that the
system satisfies the weaker policy. In future, we will exclude these internal
states from the system state. If this is not possible for any reason, we will
constrain what may flow through these newly introduced domain interferences.
This is a property which can be proven using partial equivalence relations and
bisimulation [13].
5 Conclusion
In this report, a brief overview of the model-driven approach, called IFlow, was
given and the modeling guidelines were explained. The formal aspects of the
approach and the establishment of a formal framework were then presented in
mored detail. This includes the definition of a model for formal specifications
and their systematic derivation from an IFlow UML model. Further, the spec-
ification and verification of information flow properties within our framework
were presented. For this process, we provided guidelines resulting from personal
experiences.
We found that defining an appropriate information flow policy for the non-
interference property is quite difficult. On the one hand, all requirements which
are imposed on the system must be captured; on the other hand, they have to
be precise in order to not reject intuitively secure systems. We learned that a
policy, in contrast to our expectations, often is not satisfied by a system since
subtle information flows are easily overlooked. While specification of informa-
tion flow policies was challenging, verification was surprisingly straight forward.
Since our verification tool reached a high degree of automation for the proofs,
the required effort was very low. If a policy was not satisfiable by the system,
verification provided helpful feedback by pointing to problematic spots of the
information flow specification. Thus, an iterative process was established where
verification provided quick feedback and the policy could be refined continu-
ously.
In the future, we will program an automatic transformation which generates
the formal specification from a UML model. We want to be able to prove more
properties with information flow policies and declassification channels which
are restricted in the what- and where-dimensions [13]. According to our overall
approach Figure 1, a refinement relation between the formal specification and
the code level will be established formally and property equivalence between
code analysis tools (see [8]) and our model-based formalism are investigated in
order to integrate verification with automated checkers on code level.
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A Travel Planner UML Model
Figure 8: Application component diagram
19
Figure 9: Application messages diagram
Figure 10: Standard classes
20
Figure 11: Standard user messages
Figure 12: Behavior overview diagram
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Figure 13: Request flight offers
Figure 14: Choose a flight
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Figure 15: Release credit card details
Figure 16: Booking flight
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Figure 17: Specification Graph
B KIV specifications
The specification graph of Figure 17 shows the assembly and dependencis of
several modular specifications. The color of the nodes indicates different kind
of specifications. Orange colored notes show specification which are imported
from another KIV project. On the one hand, the specification of the generic
noninterfernce theory of van der Meyden. The single specifications are depicted
in Section B.1. On the other hand, some auxiliary specifications are used (see
Section B.4. The green nodes are specifications of the current project. The
color green indicates that all theorems about these specifications have been
proven. These nodes include the system specification of the Travel Planner case
study and the formalization of an information flow policy. The specifications are
shown in detail in Sections B.2 and B.3 respectively. The specification at the
top, called instance (see page 42), declares that the Travel Planner instantiates
the generic theory and defines the mapping. The instantiation has been proven.
B.1 Specification of generic noninterference theory of
van der Meyden
MeydenIntrans, 25
AccessControl, 25
gen-command-list, 26
gen-secdomain-set, 26
gen-commands, 26
gen-name, 26
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gen-secdomain, 27
gen-systemstate, 27
gen-value, 27
MeydenIntrans =
enrich AccessControl, gen-command-list, gen-secdomain-set with
functions
run : systemstate × commandlist → systemstate ;
run : commandlist → systemstate ;
ipurge : commandlist × secdomain → commandlist ;
sources : commandlist × secdomain → secdomainset ;
predicates
eqds : systemstate × secdomainset × systemstate;
secure : systemstate;
axioms
eqds-def : eqds(sys, ds, sys0) ↔ (∀ d. d ∈ ds → eqd(sys, d, sys0));
run-base : run(sys, []) = sys;
run-rec : run(sys, co ’ + cl) = run(step(sys, co), cl);
run-initial : run(cl) = run(initialstate, cl);
sources-base : sources([], d) = ∅ ++ d;
sources-rec :
sources(co ’ + cl, d)
= (∃ d0. d0 ∈ sources(cl, d) ∧ cdom(co) ⇒ d0 ⊃ sources(cl, d) ++
cdom(co) ; sources(cl, d));
ipurge-base : ipurge([], d) = [];
ipurge-rec :
ipurge(co ’ + cl, d)
= (cdom(co) ∈ sources(co + cl, d) ⊃ co + ipurge(cl, d) ; ipurge(cl,
d));
end enrich
AccessControl =
enrich gen-secdomain, gen-systemstate, gen-commands, gen-value, gen-name with
functions
contents : systemstate × name → value ;
obs : systemstate × secdomain → systemstate ;
step : systemstate × command → systemstate ;
cdom : command → secdomain ;
predicates
observe : name × secdomain;
alter : name × secdomain;
. ⇒ . : secdomain × secdomain;
eqd : systemstate × secdomain × systemstate;
axioms
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eqd-def :
eqd(sys, d, sys0) ↔ (∀ nam. observe(nam, d) → contents(sys, nam)
= contents(sys0, nam));
obs-in-domain : observe(nam, d) → contents(obs(sys, d), nam) =
contents(sys, nam);
obs-other-domain : ¬ observe(nam, d) → contents(obs(sys, d),
nam) = null;
extensionality : sys = sys0 ↔ (∀ nam. contents(sys, nam) =
contents(sys0, nam));
RMA-2 :
eqd(sys, cdom(co), sys0)
∧ contents(sys, nam) = contents(sys0, nam)
∧ alter(nam, cdom(co))
→ contents(step(sys, co), nam) = contents(step(sys0, co), nam);
RMA-3 : contents(step(sys, co), nam) 6= contents(sys, nam) →
alter(nam, cdom(co));
alter-observe-respects-policy : alter(nam, d) ∧ observe(nam, d0) →
d ⇒ d0;
end enrich
gen-command-list =
actualize list-last with gen-commands by morphism
list → commandlist; elem → command; x → cl; x0 → cl0; x1 →
cl1; y → cl2; z → cl3; y0 → cl4; z0 → cl5; y1 → cl6; z1 → cl7;
x2 → cl8; y2 → cl9; z2 → cl10; a → co; a0 → co0; b → co1; c →
co2
end actualize
gen-secdomain-set =
actualize set-union with gen-secdomain by morphism
set → secdomainset; elem → secdomain; s → ds; s0 → ds0; s1
→ ds1; s2 → ds2; a → d; b → d0; c → d1
end actualize
gen-commands =
specification
sorts command;
variables co: command;
end specification
gen-name =
specification
sorts name;
variables nam: name;
end specification
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gen-secdomain =
specification
sorts secdomain;
variables d, d0, d1: secdomain;
end specification
gen-systemstate =
specification
sorts systemstate;
constants initialstate : systemstate;
variables sys, sys0, sys1: systemstate;
end specification
gen-value =
specification
sorts value;
constants null : value;
variables v, v0, v1: value;
end specification
B.2 Case Study Travel Planner: System Specification
ASM, 27
prelims-idleState, 38
localMethods, 39
userMethods, 39
contents, 39
data, 39
name, 40
agent, 41
command, 41
ASM =
asm specification ASM
using localMethods, userMethods, acceptedCmds
procedures
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ASM : name × agent → data × bool;
STEP : name × agent → data × bool;
EXEC command : name × agent → data;
START command : name × agent → data;
GETINPUTREQUESTDATA command : name × agent → data;
RETINPUTREQUESTDATA command : name × agent → data;
GETFLIGHTOFFERSTT command : name × agent → data;
GETFLIGHTOFFERSTA command : name × agent → data;
FILTEROFFERS command : name × agent → data;
RETFLIGHTOFFERSAT command : name × agent → data;
RETFLIGHTOFFERSTT command : name × agent → data;
GETSINGLESELECTION command : name × agent → data;
RETSINGLESELECTION command : name × agent → data;
RELEASECCD command : name × agent → data;
CONFIRMRELEASE command : name × agent → data;
RETCONFIRMATION command : name × agent → data;
DECLASSIFYCCD command : name × agent → data;
DECLASSIFIEDCCD command : name × agent → data;
DECLASSYFLIGHTOFFER command : name × agent → data;
BOOKFLIGHTOFFER command : name × agent → data;
PROCESSBOOKING command : name × agent → data;
OKBOOKFLIGHTOFFER command : name × agent → data;
SENDCONFIRMBOOKING command : name × agent → data;
CONFIRMBOOKING command : name × agent → data;
PAYCOMMISSION command : name × agent → data;
OKPAYCOMMISSION command : name × agent → data;
OKCONFIRMBOOKING command : name × agent → data;
PROVIDEINPUT GETINPUTREQUESTDATA : name × agent → data;
PROVIDEINPUT GETSINGLESELECTION : name × agent → data;
PROVIDEINPUT CONFIRMRELEASE : name × agent → data;
U FINISHED command : name × agent → data;
TP NEXT command : name × agent → data;
TA NEXT command : name × agent → data;
A NEXT command : name × agent → data;
CCC NEXT command : name × agent → data;
state variables c, boolvar;
initial state init(c)
final state boolvar
asm rule STEP
declaration
ASM(c, boolvar) { while ¬ boolvar do STEP }; ;
STEP(c, boolvar) { boolvar := ?;
choose cmd with true in
EXEC }; ;
EXEC(cmd; var c)
{
if cmd = StartCmd then START else
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if cmd = GetInputRequestDataCmd then
GETINPUTREQUESTDATA else
if cmd = RetInputRequestDataCmd then
RETINPUTREQUESTDATA else
if cmd = GetFlightOffersTTCmd then GETFLIGHTOFFERSTT else
if cmd = GetFlightOffersTACmd then GETFLIGHTOFFERSTA else
if cmd = FilterOffersCmd then FILTEROFFERS else
if cmd = RetFlightOffersATCmd then RETFLIGHTOFFERSAT else
if cmd = RetFlightOffersTTCmd then RETFLIGHTOFFERSTT else
if cmd = GetSingleSelectionCmd then GETSINGLESELECTION else
if cmd = RetSingleSelectionCmd then RETSINGLESELECTION else
if cmd = ReleaseCCDCmd then RELEASECCD else
if cmd = ConfirmReleaseCmd then CONFIRMRELEASE else
if cmd = RetConfirmationCmd then RETCONFIRMATION else
if cmd = DeclassifyCCDCmd then DECLASSIFYCCD else
if cmd = DeclassifiedCCDCmd then DECLASSIFIEDCCD else
if cmd = DeclassifyFlightOfferCmd then DECLASSYFLIGHTOFFER
else
if cmd = BookFlightOfferCmd then BOOKFLIGHTOFFER else
if cmd = ProcessBookingCmd then PROCESSBOOKING else
if cmd = OkBookFlightOfferCmd then OKBOOKFLIGHTOFFER else
if cmd = SendConfirmBookingCmd then SENDCONFIRMBOOKING
else
if cmd = ConfirmBookingCmd then CONFIRMBOOKING else
if cmd = PayCommissionCmd then PAYCOMMISSION else
if cmd = OkPayCommissionCmd then OKPAYCOMMISSION else
if cmd = OkConfirmBookingCmd then OKCONFIRMBOOKING
};
START(cmd; var c)
{
if TP receivedExpected(StartCmd, c) then
{TP NEXT; c(Inbox(GetInputRequestDataCmd), User(0)) :=
GetInputRequestData}
};
GETINPUTREQUESTDATA(cmd; var c)
{
if U received(GetInputRequestDataCmd, c) then
{
PROVIDEINPUT GETINPUTREQUESTDATA;
c(Inbox(RetInputRequestDataCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) :=
RetInputRequest-
Data(makeInputRequestData(c(input(GetInputRequestDataCmd),
User(0))));
U FINISHED
}
};
RETINPUTREQUESTDATA(cmd; var c)
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{
if TP receivedExpected(RetInputRequestDataCmd, c) then
{
c(requestData, TravelPlanner(0)) :=
c(Inbox(RetInputRequestDataCmd), TravelPlanner(0)).input;
TP NEXT;
c(Inbox(GetFlightOffersTTCmd), TravelAgency(0)) :=
GetFlightOffers(c(requestData, TravelPlanner(0)))
}
};
GETFLIGHTOFFERSTT(cmd; var c)
{
if TA receivedExpected(GetFlightOffersTTCmd, c) then
{
c(requestData, TravelAgency(0)) :=
c(Inbox(GetFlightOffersTTCmd), TravelAgency(0)).requestData;
TA NEXT;
c(Inbox(GetFlightOffersTACmd), Airline(0)) :=
GetFlightOffers(c(requestData, TravelAgency(0)))
}
};
GETFLIGHTOFFERSTA(cmd; var c)
{
if A receivedExpected(GetFlightOffersTACmd, c) then
{
c(requestData, Airline(0)) := c(Inbox(GetFlightOffersTACmd),
Airline(0)).requestData;
A NEXT
}
};
FILTEROFFERS(cmd; var c)
{
if c(waiting4, Airline(0)) = Command(FilterOffersCmd) then
{
c(filteredFlightOffers, Airline(0)) := filterOffers(c(requestData,
Airline(0)).requestData, c(flightOffers, Airline(0)));
A NEXT;
c(Inbox(RetFlightOffersATCmd), TravelAgency(0)) :=
RetFlightOffers(c(filteredFlightOffers, Airline(0)))
}
};
RETFLIGHTOFFERSAT(cmd; var c)
{
if TA receivedExpected(RetFlightOffersATCmd, c) then
{
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c(filteredFlightOffers, TravelAgency(0)) :=
c(Inbox(RetFlightOffersATCmd), TravelAgency(0)).flightOffers;
TA NEXT;
c(Inbox(RetFlightOffersTTCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) :=
RetFlightOffers(c(filteredFlightOffers, TravelAgency(0)))
}
};
RETFLIGHTOFFERSTT(cmd; var c)
{
if TP receivedExpected(RetFlightOffersTTCmd, c) then
{
c(flightOffers, TravelPlanner(0)) :=
c(Inbox(RetFlightOffersTTCmd), TravelPlanner(0)).flightOffers;
TP NEXT;
c(Inbox(GetSingleSelectionCmd), User(0)) :=
GetSingleSelection(c(flightOffers, TravelPlanner(0)))
}
};
GETSINGLESELECTION(cmd; var c)
{
if U received(GetSingleSelectionCmd, c) then
{
PROVIDEINPUT GETSINGLESELECTION;
c(Inbox(RetSingleSelectionCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) :=
RetSingleSelection(selectOne(c(Inbox(GetSingleSelectionCmd),
User(0)).selection, c(input(GetSingleSelectionCmd), User(0))));
U FINISHED
}
};
RETSINGLESELECTION(cmd; var c)
{
if TP receivedExpected(RetSingleSelectionCmd, c) then
{
c(flightOffer, TravelPlanner(0)) :=
c(Inbox(RetSingleSelectionCmd), TravelPlanner(0)).selection;
TP NEXT;
c(Inbox(ReleaseCCDCmd), CreditCardCenter(0)) :=
ReleaseCCD(Agent(c(flightOffer, TravelPlanner(0)).airline))
}
};
RELEASECCD(cmd; var c)
{
if CCC receivedExpected(ReleaseCCDCmd, c) then
{
c(airline, CreditCardCenter(0)) := c(Inbox(ReleaseCCDCmd),
CreditCardCenter(0)).receiver;
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CCC NEXT;
c(Inbox(ConfirmReleaseCmd), User(0)) := ConfirmRelease(c(ccd,
CreditCardCenter(0)), c(airline, CreditCardCenter(0)))
}
};
CONFIRMRELEASE(cmd; var c)
{
if U received(ConfirmReleaseCmd, c) then
{
PROVIDEINPUT CONFIRMRELEASE;
if confirmRelease(c(Inbox(ConfirmReleaseCmd), User(0)).what,
c(Inbox(ConfirmReleaseCmd), User(0)).receiver,
c(input(ConfirmReleaseCmd), User(0))).boolean
then
c(Inbox(RetConfirmationCmd), CreditCardCenter(0)) :=
RetConfirmation;
U FINISHED
}
};
RETCONFIRMATION(cmd; var c)
{
if CCC receivedExpected(RetConfirmationCmd, c) then CCC NEXT
};
DECLASSIFYCCD(cmd; var c)
{
if c(waiting4, CreditCardCenter(0)) = Command(DeclassifyCCDCmd)
then
{
c(ccd decl, CreditCardCenter(0)) := declassify(c(ccd,
CreditCardCenter(0)));
CCC NEXT;
c(Inbox(DeclassifiedCCDCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) :=
DeclassifiedCCD(c(ccd decl, CreditCardCenter(0)))
}
};
DECLASSIFIEDCCD(cmd; var c)
{
if TP receivedExpected(DeclassifiedCCDCmd, c) then
{
c(ccd decl, TravelPlanner(0)) := c(Inbox(DeclassifiedCCDCmd),
TravelPlanner(0)).ccd;
TP NEXT
}
};
DECLASSYFLIGHTOFFER(cmd; var c)
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{
if c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) =
Command(DeclassifyFlightOfferCmd) then
{
c(id, TravelPlanner(0)) := declassify(c(flightOffer,
TravelPlanner(0)).id);
TP NEXT;
c(Inbox(BookFlightOfferCmd), Airline(0)) :=
BookFlightOffer(c(id, TravelPlanner(0)).id, c(ccd decl, TravelPlanner(0)))
}
};
BOOKFLIGHTOFFER(cmd; var c)
{
if A receivedExpected(BookFlightOfferCmd, c) then
{
c(id, Airline(0)) := c(Inbox(BookFlightOfferCmd), Airline(0));
c(ccd decl, Airline(0)) := c(Inbox(BookFlightOfferCmd),
Airline(0)).ccd;
A NEXT
}
};
PROCESSBOOKING(cmd; var c)
{
if c(waiting4, Airline(0)) = Command(ProcessBookingCmd) then
{
if processBooking(c(id, Airline(0)), c(ccd decl, Airline(0))).boolean
↔ true then
c(Inbox(OkBookFlightOfferCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) := Ok;
A NEXT
}
};
OKBOOKFLIGHTOFFER(cmd; var c)
{
if TP receivedExpected(OkBookFlightOfferCmd, c) then TP NEXT
};
SENDCONFIRMBOOKING(cmd; var c)
{
if c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) =
Command(SendConfirmBookingCmd) then
{
TP NEXT;
c(Inbox(ConfirmBookingCmd), TravelAgency(0)) :=
ConfirmBooking(c(flightOffer, TravelPlanner(0)).id)
}
};
CONFIRMBOOKING(cmd; var c)
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{
if TA receivedExpected(ConfirmBookingCmd, c) then
{
c(id, TravelAgency(0)) := c(Inbox(ConfirmBookingCmd),
TravelAgency(0)).id;
TA NEXT;
c(Inbox(PayCommissionCmd), Airline(0)) := PayCommission(c(id,
TravelAgency(0)))
}
};
PAYCOMMISSION(cmd; var c)
{
if A receivedExpected(PayCommissionCmd, c) then
{
c(id, Airline(0)) := c(Inbox(PayCommissionCmd), Airline(0));
A NEXT;
c(Inbox(OkPayCommissionCmd), TravelAgency(0)) := Ok
}
};
OKPAYCOMMISSION(cmd; var c)
{
if TA receivedExpected(OkPayCommissionCmd, c) then
{TA NEXT; c(Inbox(OkConfirmBookingCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) :=
Ok}
};
OKCONFIRMBOOKING(cmd; var c)
{
if TP receivedExpected(OkConfirmBookingCmd, c) then TP NEXT
};
PROVIDEINPUT GETINPUTREQUESTDATA(c)
{
c(input(GetInputRequestDataCmd), User(0)) :=
(c(allInputs(GetInputRequestDataCmd),
User(0)).at)(c(inputCounter(GetInputRequestDataCmd), User(0)).nr);
c(inputCounter(GetInputRequestDataCmd), User(0)) :=
InputCounter(c(inputCounter(GetInputRequestDataCmd), User(0)).nr + 1)
};
PROVIDEINPUT GETSINGLESELECTION(c)
{
c(input(GetSingleSelectionCmd), User(0)) :=
(c(allInputs(GetSingleSelectionCmd),
User(0)).at)(c(inputCounter(GetSingleSelectionCmd), User(0)).nr);
c(inputCounter(GetSingleSelectionCmd), User(0)) :=
InputCounter(c(inputCounter(GetSingleSelectionCmd), User(0)).nr + 1)
};
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PROVIDEINPUT CONFIRMRELEASE(c)
{
c(input(ConfirmReleaseCmd), User(0)) :=
(c(allInputs(ConfirmReleaseCmd),
User(0)).at)(c(inputCounter(ConfirmReleaseCmd), User(0)).nr);
c(inputCounter(ConfirmReleaseCmd), User(0)) :=
InputCounter(c(inputCounter(ConfirmReleaseCmd), User(0)).nr + 1)
};
U FINISHED(cmd; var c)
{
if cmd = GetInputRequestDataCmd then
c(Inbox(GetInputRequestDataCmd), User(0)) := null else
if cmd = GetSingleSelectionCmd then
c(Inbox(GetSingleSelectionCmd), User(0)) := null
else
if cmd = ConfirmReleaseCmd then c(Inbox(ConfirmReleaseCmd),
User(0)) := null
};
TP NEXT(cmd; var c)
{
if cmd = StartCmd then
{
c(Inbox(StartCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) :=
Command(RetInputRequestDataCmd)
}
else
if cmd = RetInputRequestDataCmd then
{
c(Inbox(RetInputRequestDataCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) :=
Command(RetFlightOffersTTCmd)
}
else
if cmd = RetFlightOffersTTCmd then
{
c(Inbox(RetFlightOffersTTCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) :=
Command(RetSingleSelectionCmd)
}
else
if cmd = RetSingleSelectionCmd then
{
c(Inbox(RetSingleSelectionCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) := Command(DeclassifiedCCDCmd)
}
else
if cmd = DeclassifiedCCDCmd then
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{
c(Inbox(DeclassifiedCCDCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) :=
Command(DeclassifyFlightOfferCmd)
}
else
if cmd = DeclassifyFlightOfferCmd then
c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) := Command(OkBookFlightOfferCmd)
else
if cmd = OkBookFlightOfferCmd then
{
c(Inbox(OkBookFlightOfferCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) :=
Command(SendConfirmBookingCmd)
}
else
if cmd = SendConfirmBookingCmd then
c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) := Command(OkConfirmBookingCmd)
else
if cmd = OkConfirmBookingCmd then
{
c(Inbox(OkConfirmBookingCmd), TravelPlanner(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0)) := Idle
}
};
TA NEXT(cmd; var c)
{
if cmd = GetFlightOffersTTCmd then
{
c(Inbox(GetFlightOffersTTCmd), TravelAgency(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelAgency(0)) :=
Command(RetFlightOffersATCmd)
}
else
if cmd = RetFlightOffersATCmd then
{
c(Inbox(RetFlightOffersATCmd), TravelAgency(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelAgency(0)) := Idle
}
else
if cmd = ConfirmBookingCmd then
{
c(Inbox(ConfirmBookingCmd), TravelAgency(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, TravelAgency(0)) :=
Command(OkPayCommissionCmd)
}
else
if cmd = OkPayCommissionCmd then
{
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c(Inbox(OkPayCommissionCmd), TravelAgency(0)) :=
null;
c(waiting4, TravelAgency(0)) := Idle
}
};
A NEXT(cmd; var c)
{
if cmd = GetFlightOffersTACmd then
{
c(Inbox(GetFlightOffersTACmd), Airline(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, Airline(0)) := Command(FilterOffersCmd)
}
else
if cmd = FilterOffersCmd then
c(waiting4, Airline(0)) := Command(GetFlightOffersTACmd)
else
if cmd = BookFlightOfferCmd then
{
c(Inbox(BookFlightOfferCmd), Airline(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, Airline(0)) := Command(ProcessBookingCmd)
}
else
if cmd = ProcessBookingCmd then c(waiting4, Airline(0)) :=
Idle else
if cmd = PayCommissionCmd then
{
c(Inbox(PayCommissionCmd), Airline(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, Airline(0)) := Idle
}
};
CCC NEXT(cmd; var c)
{
if cmd = ReleaseCCDCmd then
{
c(Inbox(ReleaseCCDCmd), CreditCardCenter(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, CreditCardCenter(0)) :=
Command(RetConfirmationCmd)
}
else
if cmd = RetConfirmationCmd then
{
c(Inbox(RetConfirmationCmd), CreditCardCenter(0)) := null;
c(waiting4, CreditCardCenter(0)) :=
Command(DeclassifyCCDCmd)
}
else
if cmd = DeclassifyCCDCmd then c(waiting4,
CreditCardCenter(0)) := Idle
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} end asm specification
prelims-idleState =
enrich localMethods, userMethods, contents with
predicates
init : (name × agent → data);
U received : command × (name × agent → data);
TP receivedExpected : command × (name × agent → data);
TA receivedExpected : command × (name × agent → data);
A receivedExpected : command × (name × agent → data);
CCC receivedExpected : command × (name × agent → data);
TP acceptedFromIdle : command;
TA acceptedFromIdle : command;
A acceptedFromIdle : command;
CCC acceptedFromIdle : command;
axioms
init-def :
init(c)
↔ TP receivedExpected(StartCmd, c)
∧ c(waiting4, TravelAgency(0)) = Idle
∧ c(waiting4, Airline(0)) = Idle
∧ c(waiting4, CreditCardCenter(0)) = Idle;
U received-def : U received(cmd, c) ↔ c(Inbox(cmd), User(0)) 6=
null;
TP receivedExpected-def :
TP receivedExpected(cmd, c)
↔ (TP acceptedFromIdle(cmd) → c(waiting4, TravelPlanner(0))
= Idle)
∧ (¬ TP acceptedFromIdle(cmd) → c(waiting4,
TravelPlanner(0)) = Command(cmd))
∧ c(Inbox(cmd), TravelPlanner(0)) 6= null;
TA receivedExpected-def :
TA receivedExpected(cmd, c)
↔ (TA acceptedFromIdle(cmd) → c(waiting4, TravelAgency(0))
= Idle)
∧ (¬ TA acceptedFromIdle(cmd) → c(waiting4,
TravelAgency(0)) = Command(cmd))
∧ c(Inbox(cmd), TravelAgency(0)) 6= null;
A receivedExpected-def :
A receivedExpected(cmd, c)
↔ (A acceptedFromIdle(cmd) → c(waiting4, Airline(0)) = Idle)
∧ (¬ A acceptedFromIdle(cmd) → c(waiting4, Airline(0)) =
Command(cmd))
∧ c(Inbox(cmd), Airline(0)) 6= null;
CCC receivedExpected-def :
CCC receivedExpected(cmd, c)
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↔ (CCC acceptedFromIdle(cmd) → c(waiting4,
CreditCardCenter(0)) = Idle)
∧ (¬ CCC acceptedFromIdle(cmd) → c(waiting4,
CreditCardCenter(0)) = Command(cmd))
∧ c(Inbox(cmd), CreditCardCenter(0)) 6= null;
TP acceptedFromIdle-def : TP acceptedFromIdle(cmd) ↔ cmd =
StartCmd;
TA acceptedFromIdle-def :
TA acceptedFromIdle(cmd) ↔ cmd = GetFlightOffersTTCmd ∨
cmd = ConfirmBookingCmd;
A acceptedFromIdle-def :
A acceptedFromIdle(cmd) ↔ cmd = GetFlightOffersTACmd ∨
cmd = BookFlightOfferCmd;
CCC acceptedFromIdle-def : CCC acceptedFromIdle(cmd) ↔ cmd
= ReleaseCCDCmd;
end enrich
localMethods =
enrich data with
functions
declassify : data → data ;
filterOffers : data × data → data ;
processBooking : data × data → data ;
end enrich
userMethods =
enrich data with
functions
makeInputRequestData : data → data ;
selectOne : data × data → data ;
selectMultiple : data × data → data ;
confirmRelease : data × data × data → data ;
end enrich
contents =
enrich name, data with
variables c, c0, c1, c2: name × agent → data;
end enrich
data =
data specification
using command, string-less, nat-mult, agent
39
data = CreditCardDetails (. .data : string ;) with isCreditCardDetails
| FlightOffer (. .id : data ; . .airline : agent ;) with isFlightOffer
| RequestData (. .data : string ;) with isRequestData
| GetFlightOffers (. .requestData : data ;) with isGetFlightOffers
| RetFlightOffers (. .flightOffers : data ;) with isRetFlightOffers
| ReleaseCCD (. .receiver : data ;) with isReleaseCCD
| DeclassifiedCCD (. .ccd : data ;) with isDeclassifiedCCD
| BookFlightOffer (. .id : data ; . .ccd : data ;) with isBookFlightOffer
| ConfirmBooking (. .id : data ;)
| PayCommission (. .id : data ;)
| DataList (. .list : dataList ;) with isDataList
| Input (. .at : nat → data ;) with isInput
| InputCounter (. .nr : nat ;) with isInputCounter
| Boolean (. .boolean : bool ;) with isBoolean
| Number (. .number : nat ;) with isNumber
| Command (. .cmd : command ;) with isCommand
| Idle
| Agent (. .agent : agent ;) with isAgent
| null
| Start
| GetInputRequestData
| RetInputRequestData (. .input : data ;) with isRetInputRequestData
| GetSingleSelection (. .selection : data ;) with isGetSingleSelection
| RetSingleSelection (. .selection : data ;) with isRetSingleSelection
| GetMulitpleSelection (. .selection : data ;) with isGetMultipleSelection
| RetMultipleSelection (. .selection : data ;) with isRetMultipleSelection
| ConfirmRelease (. .what : data ; . .receiver : data ;) with isConfirmRelease
| RetConfirmation
| Show (. .data : data ;) with isShow
| Ok
;
dataList = []
| . + . prio 9 (. .first : data ; . .rest : dataList ;) prio 9
;
variables
d, d0, d1: data;
dl, dl0, dl1: dataList;
userInputs, userInputs0, userInputs1: nat → data;
end data specification
name =
data specification
using command
name = ccd
| ccd decl
| flightOffer
| flightOffer decl
| requestData
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| flightOffers
| filteredFlightOffers
| airline
| id
| allInputs (. .cmd : command ;) with isAllInputs
| inputCounter (. .cmd : command ;) with isInputCounter
| input (. .cmd : command ;) with isInput
| waiting4
| Inbox (. .cmd : command ;) with isInbox
;
variables nam, nam0, nam1: name;
end data specification
agent =
data specification
using nat-mult
agent = User (. .id : nat ;) with isUser
| TravelPlanner (. .id : nat ;) with isTravelPlanner
| TravelAgency (. .id : nat ;) with isTravelAgency
| Airline (. .id : nat ;) with isAirline
| CreditCardCenter (. .id : nat ;) with isCreditCardCenter
;
variables ag, ag0, ag1: agent;
end data specification
command =
data specification
using nat-mult
command = StartCmd
| GetInputRequestDataCmd
| RetInputRequestDataCmd
| GetFlightOffersTTCmd
| GetFlightOffersTACmd
| FilterOffersCmd
| RetFlightOffersATCmd
| RetFlightOffersTTCmd
| GetSingleSelectionCmd
| RetSingleSelectionCmd
| ReleaseCCDCmd
| ConfirmReleaseCmd
| RetConfirmationCmd
| DeclassifyCCDCmd
| DeclassifiedCCDCmd
| DeclassifyFlightOfferCmd
| BookFlightOfferCmd
| ProcessBookingCmd
| OkBookFlightOfferCmd
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| SendConfirmBookingCmd
| ConfirmBookingCmd
| PayCommissionCmd
| OkPayCommissionCmd
| OkConfirmBookingCmd
| GetMultipleSelectionCmd
| RetMultipleSelectionCmd
| Show
;
variables cmd, cmd0, cmd1, cmd2: command;
end data specification
B.3 Case Study Travel Planner: Information Flow
Property Specification
Instance, 42
Security, 42
dom, 43
domInterference, 44
eqd, 44
obs, 44
observeAlter, 45
domain, 48
Instance =
instantiate (AccessControl) < MeydenIntrans with TravelPlanner by
mapping
systemstate → (name × agent → data); secdomain → domain;
value → data; name → name, agent; initialstate → (λ nam, ag.
null); null → (null); cdom → (dom); contents → (λ c, nam, ag.
c(nam, ag)); step→ (STEP#); obs→ (obs); observe→ (λ nam,
ag, domvar. observe(domvar, nam, ag)); alter → (λ nam, ag,
domvar. alter(domvar, nam, ag)); ⇒ → (⇒); eqd → (eqd); sys
→ c; sys0 → c0; sys1 → c1; d → domvar; d0 → domvar0; d1 →
domvar1; nam → nam, ag; v → v; v0 → v0; v1 → v1 rename
end instantiate
Security =
enrich ASM, eqd, dom, domInterference, obs with
procedures STEP#name × agent → data× command : name × agent → data;
declaration
STEP#(c, cmd; var c0) { EXEC(cmd; c);
c0 := c };
axioms
User TA A Dom ⇒ User A Dom;
User TA A Dom ⇒ User Decl2A Dom;
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User A Dom ⇒ User Decl2A Dom;
User Decl2A Dom ⇒ Decl2A Dom;
Decl2A Dom ⇒ User A Dom;
¬ User A Dom ⇒ User TA A Dom;
¬ User Decl2A Dom ⇒ User TA A Dom;
¬ Decl2A Dom ⇒ User TA A Dom;
¬ User Decl2A Dom ⇒ User A Dom;
¬ Decl2A Dom ⇒ User Decl2A Dom;
¬ User A Dom ⇒ Decl2A Dom;
¬ User TA A Dom ⇒ Decl2A Dom;
end enrich
dom =
enrich domain, command with
functions dom : command → domain ;
axioms
dom(StartCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(GetInputRequestDataCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(RetInputRequestDataCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(GetFlightOffersTTCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(GetFlightOffersTACmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(FilterOffersCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(RetFlightOffersATCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(RetFlightOffersTTCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(GetSingleSelectionCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(RetSingleSelectionCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(ReleaseCCDCmd) = User Decl2A Dom;
dom(ConfirmReleaseCmd) = User Decl2A Dom;
dom(RetConfirmationCmd) = User Decl2A Dom;
dom(DeclassifyCCDCmd) = Decl2A Dom;
dom(DeclassifiedCCDCmd) = User A Dom;
dom(DeclassifyFlightOfferCmd) = User A Dom;
dom(BookFlightOfferCmd) = User A Dom;
dom(ProcessBookingCmd) = User A Dom;
dom(OkBookFlightOfferCmd) = User A Dom;
dom(SendConfirmBookingCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(ConfirmBookingCmd) = User TA A Dom;
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dom(PayCommissionCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(OkPayCommissionCmd) = User TA A Dom;
dom(OkConfirmBookingCmd) = User TA A Dom;
end enrich
domInterference =
enrich domain with
predicates . ⇒ . : domain × domain;
axioms
reflexivity : domvar ⇒ domvar;
User TA A Dom ⇒ User A Dom;
User TA A Dom ⇒ User Decl2A Dom;
User A Dom ⇒ User Decl2A Dom;
User Decl2A Dom ⇒ Decl2A Dom;
Decl2A Dom ⇒ User A Dom;
Decl2A Dom ⇒ User Decl2A Dom;
User A Dom ⇒ User TA A Dom;
end enrich
eqd =
enrich observeAlter with
predicates eqd : (name × agent → data) × domain × (name × agent → data);
axioms
eqd :
eqd(c, domvar, c0) ↔ (∀ nam, ag. observe(domvar, nam, ag) →
c(nam, ag) = c0(nam, ag));
end enrich
obs =
enrich observeAlter with
functions obs : (name × agent → data) × domain → name × agent → data ;
axioms
obs-in-domain : observe(domvar, nam, ag) → (obs(c,
domvar))(nam, ag) = c(nam, ag);
obs-other-domain : ¬ observe(domvar, nam, ag) → (obs(c,
domvar))(nam, ag) = null;
44
end enrich
observeAlter =
enrich domain, contents with
predicates
observe : domain × name × agent;
alter : domain × name × agent;
axioms
observe-User TA A Dom :
observe(User TA A Dom, nam, ag)
↔ ¬ ¬ ( nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(StartCmd) ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetInputRequestDataCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = inputCounter(GetInputRequestDataCmd) ∧ ag
= User(0)
∨ nam = allInputs(GetInputRequestDataCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = input(GetInputRequestDataCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = inputCounter(GetSingleSelectionCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = allInputs(GetSingleSelectionCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = input(GetSingleSelectionCmd) ∧ ag = User(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetInputRequestDataCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = requestData ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetFlightOffersTTCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = requestData ∧ ag = TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetFlightOffersTACmd) ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetFlightOffersTACmd) ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = requestData ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = flightOffers ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = filteredFlightOffers ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetFlightOffersATCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetFlightOffersTTCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = flightOffers ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetSingleSelectionCmd) ∧ ag = User(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetSingleSelectionCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = flightOffer ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
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∨ nam = Inbox(ConfirmBookingCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = id ∧ ag = TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(PayCommissionCmd) ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(OkPayCommissionCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(OkConfirmBookingCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0));
alter-User TA A Dom :
alter(User TA A Dom, nam, ag)
↔ ¬ ¬ ( nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(StartCmd) ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = inputCounter(GetInputRequestDataCmd) ∧ ag
= User(0)
∨ nam = input(GetInputRequestDataCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = inputCounter(GetSingleSelectionCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = input(GetSingleSelectionCmd) ∧ ag = User(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetInputRequestDataCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetInputRequestDataCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = requestData ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetFlightOffersTTCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = requestData ∧ ag = TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetFlightOffersTACmd) ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetFlightOffersTACmd) ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = requestData ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = filteredFlightOffers ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetFlightOffersATCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = filteredFlightOffers ∧ ag = TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetFlightOffersTTCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = flightOffers ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(GetSingleSelectionCmd) ∧ ag = User(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetSingleSelectionCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = flightOffer ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(ReleaseCCDCmd) ∧ ag =
CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = id ∧ ag = TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(ConfirmBookingCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(PayCommissionCmd) ∧ ag = Airline(0)
46
∨ nam = id ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(OkPayCommissionCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelAgency(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(OkConfirmBookingCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0));
observe-User Decl2A Dom :
observe(User Decl2A Dom, nam, ag)
↔ ¬ ¬ ( nam = Inbox(ReleaseCCDCmd) ∧ ag =
CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = airline ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = ccd ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(ConfirmReleaseCmd) ∧ ag = User(0)
∨ nam = inputCounter(ConfirmReleaseCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = allInputs(ConfirmReleaseCmd) ∧ ag = User(0)
∨ nam = input(ConfirmReleaseCmd) ∧ ag = User(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetConfirmationCmd) ∧ ag =
CreditCardCenter(0));
alter-User Decl2A Dom :
alter(User Decl2A Dom, nam, ag)
↔ ¬ ¬ ( nam = Inbox(ReleaseCCDCmd) ∧ ag =
CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = airline ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(ConfirmReleaseCmd) ∧ ag = User(0)
∨ nam = input(ConfirmReleaseCmd) ∧ ag = User(0)
∨ nam = inputCounter(ConfirmReleaseCmd) ∧ ag =
User(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(RetConfirmationCmd) ∧ ag =
CreditCardCenter(0));
observe-Decl2A Dom :
observe(Decl2A Dom, nam, ag)
↔ ¬ ¬ ( nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = ccd ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = ccd decl ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0));
alter-Decl2A Dom :
alter(Decl2A Dom, nam, ag)
↔ ¬ ¬ ( nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = ccd decl ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(DeclassifiedCCDCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0));
observe-User A Dom :
observe(User A Dom, nam, ag)
↔ ¬ ¬ ( nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = ccd decl ∧ ag = CreditCardCenter(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(DeclassifiedCCDCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0)
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∨ nam = flightOffer ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = id ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = ccd decl ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(BookFlightOfferCmd) ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = id ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = ccd decl ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(OkBookFlightOfferCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0));
alter-User A Dom :
alter(User A Dom, nam, ag)
↔ ¬ ¬ ( nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(DeclassifiedCCDCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = ccd decl ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = id ∧ ag = TravelPlanner(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(BookFlightOfferCmd) ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = waiting4 ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = id ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = ccd decl ∧ ag = Airline(0)
∨ nam = Inbox(OkBookFlightOfferCmd) ∧ ag =
TravelPlanner(0));
end enrich
domain =
data specification
domain = User Decl2A Dom
| User A Dom
| User TA A Dom
| Decl2A Dom
;
variables domvar, domvar0, domvar1: domain;
end data specification
B.4 Auxiliary Specifications
list-last, 49
set-union, 49
list-dup, 50
set-basic, 50
list, 51
list-data, 51
string-less, 51
elem, 52
nat-mult, 53
string-append, 53
48
nat, 53
string-data, 54
char, 54
nat-basic2, 54
nat-basic1, 54
list-last =
enrich list-dup with
functions
. .last : list → elem ;
. .butlast : list → list ;
butlastn : nat × list → list ;
rev : list → list ;
mklist : elem × nat → list ;
fillfirst : nat × elem × list → list ;
predicates
. v . : list × list;
. w . : list × list;
axioms
laststep : x 6= [] → x.butlast + x.last = x;
rev-e : rev([]) = [];
rev-r : rev(a ’ + x) = rev(x) + a;
mk-len : # mklist(a, n) = n;
mk-elem : a ∈ mklist(b, n) → a = b;
butlastN-base : butlastn(0, x) = x;
butlastN-rec : butlastn(n + 1, x) = butlastn(n, x.butlast);
fillfirst-longer : n ≤ # x → fillfirst(n, a, x) = x;
fillfirst-fill : # x < n → fillfirst(n, a, x) = mklist(a, n - # x) + x;
prefix : x v y ↔ (∃ z. x + z = y);
postfix : x w y ↔ (∃ z. z + x = y);
end enrich
set-union =
enrich set-basic with
functions
{ . } : elem → set ;
. ∪ . : set × set → set prio 9;
. ∩ . : set × set → set prio 9;
. \ . : set × set → set prio 9;
. – . : set × elem → set prio 9 left;
axioms
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One : {a} = ∅ ++ a;
Union : a ∈ s1 ∪ s2 ↔ a ∈ s1 ∨ a ∈ s2;
Intersect : a ∈ s1 ∩ s2 ↔ a ∈ s1 ∧ a ∈ s2;
Difference : a ∈ s1 \ s2 ↔ a ∈ s1 ∧ ¬ a ∈ s2;
Delete : a ∈ s – b ↔ a 6= b ∧ a ∈ s;
end enrich
list-dup =
enrich list with
functions
. ++ . : list × elem → list prio 9 left;
rmdup : list → list ;
predicates
dups : list;
disj : list × list;
axioms
rmdup-e : rmdup([]) = [];
rmdup-y : a ∈ x → rmdup(a ’ + x) = rmdup(x);
rmdup-n : ¬ a ∈ x → rmdup(a ’ + x) = a + rmdup(x);
adjoin-in : a ∈ x → x ++ a = x;
adjoin-notin : ¬ a ∈ x → x ++ a = a + x;
dups : dups(x) ↔ (∃ a, x0, y, z. x = x0 + a + y + a + z);
disjoint : disj(x, y) ↔ (∀ a. ¬ (a ∈ x ∧ a ∈ y));
end enrich
set-basic =
generic specification
parameter elem using nat target
sorts set;
constants ∅ : set;
functions
. ++ . : set × elem → set prio 9 left;
# . : set → nat ;
predicates
. ∈ . : elem × set;
. ⊆ . : set × set;
variables s, s0, s1, s2: set;
axioms
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set generated by ∅, ++;
Extension : s1 = s2 ↔ (∀ a. a ∈ s1 ↔ a ∈ s2);
In-empty : ¬ a ∈ ∅;
In-insert : a ∈ s ++ b ↔ a = b ∨ a ∈ s;
Size-empty : # ∅ = 0;
Size-insert : ¬ a ∈ s → #(s ++ a) = # s + 1;
Subset : s1 ⊆ s2 ↔ (∀ a. a ∈ s1 → a ∈ s2);
end generic specification
list =
enrich list-data with
functions
. ’ : elem → list ;
. + . : list × list → list prio 9;
. + . : list × elem → list prio 9;
. + . : elem × elem → list prio 9;
predicates . ∈ . : elem × list;
axioms
Nil : [] + x = x;
Cons : (a + x) + y = a + x + y;
One : a ’ = a + [];
Last : x + a = x + a ’;
Two : a + b = a ’ + b ’;
In : a ∈ x ↔ (∃ y, z. x = y + a + z);
end enrich
list-data =
generic data specification
parameter elem using nat
list = []
| . + . prio 9 (. .first : elem ; . .rest : list ;) prio 9
;
variables x, y, z, x0, y0, z0, x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2: list;
size functions # . : list → nat ;
order predicates . < . : list × list;
end generic data specification
string-less =
enrich string-append, nat with
constants sortedchars : string;
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functions
# . : string → nat ;
pos : char × string → nat ;
predicates
. < . : string × string;
. < . : char × char;
variables char3: char;
axioms
Length-empty : # “” = 0;
Length-rec : #(char ’ + str) = # str + 1;
Pos-empty : pos(char, “”) = 0;
Pos-found : pos(char, char ’ + str) = 0;
Pos-rec : char1 6= char2 → pos(char1, char2 ’ + str) = pos(char1,
str) + 1;
Irreflexivity : ¬ str < str;
Transitivity : str1 < str2 ∧ str2 < str3 → str1 < str3;
Totality : str1 < str2 ∨ str1 = str2 ∨ str2 < str1;
Less-empty : “” < char ’ + str;
Less-notempty : ¬ str < “”;
Less-rec : char1 ’ + str1 < char2 ’ + str2 ↔ char1 < char2 ∨ char1
= char2 ∧ str1 < str2;
Char-irref : ¬ char < char;
Char-trans : char1 < char2 ∧ char2 < char3 → char1 < char3;
Char-total : char1 < char2 ∨ char1 = char2 ∨ char2 < char1;
Char-less : char1 < char2 ↔ pos(char1, sortedchars) < pos(char2,
sortedchars);
Sortedchars :
sortedchars
= “!#$%&()∗+-
./0123456789:<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[]ˆ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz|˜”;
end enrich
elem =
specification
sorts elem;
variables a, b, c: elem;
end specification
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nat-mult =
enrich nat with
functions . ∗ . : nat × nat → nat prio 10;
axioms
m ∗ 0 = 0;
m ∗ n +1 = m ∗ n + m;
end enrich
string-append =
enrich string-data with
functions
. + . : string × string → string prio 9;
. ’ : char → string ;
variables stringvar, stringvar0: string;
axioms
chartostring : char ’ = char + “”;
append-base : “” + str = str;
append-rec : (char + str) + str0 = char + str + str0;
end enrich
nat =
enrich nat-basic2 with
functions . - . : nat × nat → nat prio 8 left;
predicates
. ≤ . : nat × nat;
. > . : nat × nat;
. ≥ . : nat × nat;
axioms
m - 0 = m;
m - n +1 = (m - n)-1;
m ≤ n ↔ ¬ n < m;
m > n ↔ n < m;
m ≥ n ↔ ¬ m < n;
end enrich
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string-data =
data specification
using char
string = “”
| . + . prio 9 (. .char1 : char ; . .rstring : string ;) prio 9
;
variables str, str0, str1, str2, str3: string;
end data specification
char =
specification
sorts char;
variables char, char0, char1, char2: char;
axioms
char generated by “a”, “b”, “c”, “d”, “e”, “f”, “g”, “h”, “i”, “j”,
“k”, “l”, “m”, “n”, “o”, “p”, “q”, “r”, “s”, “t”, “u”, “v”, “w”, “x”,
“y”, “z”, “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, “I”, “J”, “K”,
“L”, “M”, “N”, “O”, “P”, “Q”, “R”, “S”, “T”, “U”, “V”, “W”,
“X”, “Y”, “Z”, “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “ˆ”, “&”, “∗”, “ ”, “-”,
“+”, “=”, “˜”, “<”, “>”, “?”, “.”, “:”, “/”, “|”, “0”, “1”, “2”,
“3”, “4”, “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”, “9”, “(”, “)”, “[”, “]”;
end specification
nat-basic2 =
enrich nat-basic1 with
functions . + . : nat × nat → nat prio 9;
variables m, n0: nat;
axioms
n + 0 = n;
m + n +1 = (m + n)+1;
n < n0 ∨ n = n0 ∨ n0 < n;
1 = 0 +1;
0 6= 1;
end enrich
nat-basic1 =
data specification
nat = 0
| . +1 (. -1 : nat ;)
;
variables n: nat;
order predicates . < . : nat × nat;
end data specification
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